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I.  On the paradox of prudential regulations in the globalized economy  
 
In traditional Chinese medicine, the doctor is paid as long as the patient is healthy.  The patient 
comes in four times a year for a checkup and tune-up, with adjusted lifestyle recommendations. 
Payment is stopped once the patient is ill.  In the US, as long as the economy is healthy, "the 
financial doctor" in the form of the prudential regulator is considered redundant. Moreover, the 
prudential regulator is frequently viewed as a spoiler who inhibits growth an development.  This is 
the paradox of prudential regulations in the economy –the better the performance of the regulator, 
the lower may be the demand for its services.  The success of the regulator or a prolonged period 
of economic tranquility leads to complacency, reducing the demand for his services, inducing 
under-regulation, which in due course leads to a financial calamity. While the identity of economic 
actors that benefited directly from crises avoidance is unknown, the cost and the cumbrance of 
regulations are transparent.  Hence, crises that had been avoided are imperceptible and are 
underrepresented in the political discourse, and the demand for prudential regulations declines 
during prolonged good times, thereby increasing the ultimate cost of eventual crises.   
The 1990s was such a prolonged period of what was perceived as the ‘great moderation’ of 
the global economy, a period of remarkable decline in the variability of both output and inflation, 
reducing the demand for financial regulations.  This may explain the growing acceptance during 
the 1990s-2000s of Greenspan’s seductive “market-stabilizing private regulatory forces” doctrine.  
Deepening global financial integration, and the growing confidence that global risk diversification 
reduced systemic risk, sharply lowered the risk premium.  The successful private bailout of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 was taken as a vindication of the efficacy of “market-
stabilizing private regulatory forces,” where the main role of the Fed is providing coordination 
services among the private parties involved in the bailout.  Yet, the resultant complacency provides 
the background to the onset of the present crisis -- a calamity akin to a global LTCM on steroids.  
This time, however, the crisis is too big to be dealt with by private bailouts.  The present challenge 
of rethinking the Global Financial Architecture is to upgrade regulations in ways that recognize the   2
paradox of prudential regulations during times of deepening financial integration, while taking into 
account the emergence of new domestic and foreign players, and new exotic financial instruments. 
While the seeds of the present crisis were mostly home grown, international flows of 
capital magnified its costs.  Although it is a mistake to single out any class of foreign players as the 
key domino, the crisis awakened us to the need to overhaul global financial regulations.  Global 
financial integration produces the by-product of “regulatory arbitrage” – capital tends to flow to 
under-regulated countries, frequently resulting in excessive risk taking, in anticipation of future 
bailout.  Dealing with “regulatory arbitrage” would benefit by coordinated prudential regulations 
that preferably apply as equally as possible to domestic and foreign players.  Such regulations may 
be tailored to the risk category and exposure of each player above a minimum size, independent of 
the player’s nationality.  This would require a major overhaul of the information gathered by 
regulators and provide the benefit of setting a minimum global standard on information disclosure, 
as well as margin and leverage requirements on all financial players above a minimum size. A 
coordinated globalized prudential regulation, by increasing the cost of prudential deregulation, 
would mitigate the temptation to under-regulate during prolonged good times, thus adding a side 
benefit.  Thereby, it would act like Odysseus’ solution to the temptations of the Sirens: sealing 
sailors’ ears with wax.  We review in greater detail the case for comprehensive prudential 
regulation, and discuss possible implications on the investment practices of sovereign wealth funds 
[SWFs: savings funds controlled by sovereign governments that hold and manage foreign assets], 
and international hedge funds.  
 
The nature of financial crises 
Financial crises are as old as financial intermediation, and there is no reason to expect them 
to disappear. Financial intermediation entails maturity transformation—funding a longer-term 
tangible investment with shorter-term savings.  The essence of a financial crisis is a rapid financial 
disintermediation due to financial panic. In practice, this involves a “flight to quality,” where 
savers attempt to liquidate assets in financial institutions due to a sudden increase in their 
perceived risk, moving their savings to safer assets, such as foreign currency and foreign 
Governments’ bonds in developing countries, or currency, gold, and government bonds in the 
OECD countries.  As such, financial intermediation is exposed to financial fragility, in which 
heightened perceived risk may lead to liquidation, putting the entire financial system at risk.  The   3
ultimate manifestation of financial crises includes bank failures, stock market crashes, and 
currency crises, occasionally leading to deep recessions. The economist Hyman Minsky theorized 
that financial fragility—which is related to the business cycle and to leverage—is a typical feature 
of any capitalist economy. These considerations are at the heart of the large literature propagated 
by the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression, including Bernanke’s seminal works 
on these topics. 
Economic reasoning implies that the cost of inappropriate prudential regulation is 
magnifying the hazard of pre-existing distortions.  A vivid example of such a distortion is moral 
hazard: this arises when investors believe they will be bailed out of their bad investments by the 
taxpayer, and therefore, have little incentive to undertake proper monitoring of their investments 
[Heads I win, tails the taxpayer loses.]. In these circumstances, taxpayers subsidize the investment. 
A frequent rationale for such bailing out is the “too big to fail” doctrine — the cost of systemic risk 
triggered by the failure of large financial institutions frequently implies that, independent of the 
ideology of the financial regime, when push comes to shove, tax payers will bail out large financial 
institutions.  The lesson of the Great Depression is that failure to do so is too costly.  Minimizing 
the costs of such bailouts necessitates prudent regulations.  The challenge for the regulator is that, 
due to the nature of market forces and the interaction among market participants, it is impossible to 
predict the timing of a crisis.  Yet, the ugly head of moral hazard is widespread: for example 
purchasing a house with zero down payment entails private profits when the house appreciates, but 
social losses when the house depreciates significantly, when the “owner” may walk away from the 
mortgage, saddling taxpayers and the community with the losses.  Similarly, when a bank 
financing mortgages sells its portfolio to a third party, the bank’s profit base switches from the 
provision of prudential services associated with issuing mortgages into a commission based service, 
thus reducing the bank’s incentives to properly monitor the allocation of credit.  Both distortions 
can be mitigated by proper regulation, including imposing a significant minimum down payment 
on the homeowner, and capping the share of mortgages that the financing bank can package and 
resell in the market place. Enforcing these regulations calls for the watchdog to be the party spoiler, 
described by William McChesney Martin, FED Chairman during the 1950s-1960, as "take away 
the punch bowl just as the party got going.”  This activity has been in short supply in recent 
decades. 
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Globalization and financial crises      
While the seeds of the present crisis are domestic, globalization of financial markets may 
deepen domestic vulnerabilities in under-regulated markets, frequently magnifying the resultant 
appreciation of domestic assets during economic booms, and assets deflation during busts.  This 
follows the economic logic of the cost of a distortion.  In financial autarky, only the pool of 
domestic saving can feed excessive investment and risk taking induced by the moral hazard 
distortion.  Global financial integration implies that, in the absence of proper regulation, the global 
pool of saving becomes the feeder of excessive investment [see Aizenman (2002), NBER Working 
paper # 8900]. The darker side of financial globalization is that such diversification would expose 
countries to new vulnerabilities, triggered by the magnification of the moral hazard distortions in 
countries that under-regulate their markets.  This follows the logic of “regulation arbitrage,” where 
the global pool of savings moves towards markets that offer higher private rewards, at a possible 
cost of a higher bailout bill paid by the domestic taxpayer down the road.  These forces imply that 
the boundaries between domestic and global prudency regulation are getting fuzzier, calling for 
international coordination of minimum standards, where regulation would deal with risk exposure 
induced by large financial actors.  This requires setting new standards for information disclosure.      
 
On asymmetric information disclosures  
An underappreciated fact is that the regulator in the US imposes stringent disclosure 
requirements on the non-financial corporate sector, subject to strict confidentiality of the micro-
level data disclosed to the regulator.  Curiously, there is no comparable information disclosure 
requirement imposed on the financial sector.  To illustrate, the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) does an annual survey of US direct investment abroad. The data collection is confidential, 
and is based on mandatory surveys conducted by BEA from all the establishments above a critical 
size.  It contains detailed confidential information, including direct investment, employment data, 
R&D expenditures, trade in goods and services, and selected financial data.  This, and other data 
collected by Federal agencies, provides the regulator with timely information about the non-
financial sector.  In contrast, there is no comparable attempt to collect data dealing with exposure 
of the financial sector.  As a result, the regulator is frequently in the dark regarding the overall 
balance sheet exposure of investment banks, hedge funds, and other non-commercial financial 
intermediaries.  The interweaving of credit arrangements implies that the collapse of a major   5
financial institution that borrowed from financial intermediaries may trigger systemic risk, where 
the “too big to fail” doctrine induces a bail out (see the massive bailout of AIG during the Fall of 
2008).  Hence, any serious regulatory reform may start with upgrading data collection, inducing 
mandatory periodic confidential reports of the balance sheet exposure of all financial institutions 
above a minimum size operating in the domestic market.    
 
Global minimum standards for prudential regulation, and the limits to diversification gains   
Having periodically updated confidential information on the balance sheets of all the 
significant financial players allows for adopting regulations that would better fit future financial 
challenges.   The required regulatory oversight may be performed by each national authority, in 
ways akin to the role of a doctor in traditional Chinese medicine.  Insight about the regulation is 
gained by recalling a key result of economic theory: the diversification benefits associated with 
increased globalization can be best obtained by buying a share of a "global fund," composed of all 
the traded assets of all countries. Such diversification provides the best mechanism for eliminating 
idiosyncratic risks. Short of engaging in potentially destabilizing zero-sum speculation, large 
players in the global capital markets would not get, on average, more than the gains associated 
with holding such global "country funds."  Such diversification does not, however, eliminate the 
exposure to global risks, including exposure to commodity shocks, and global business cycles.   
The above suggests that passive portfolio investment in well diversified indexes is 
welcome, and does not call for any special regulation.  All other types of financial positions may 
be classified into several bins by the degree of exposure to derivatives, short positions, and 
downside risk that exposes taxpayers to possible bailouts.  The greater the taxpayer risk exposure, 
the higher may be the capital requirement imposed by prudential regulators.  The classifications 
into bins, setting maximum leverage ratios, minimum capital requirements, and other technical 
details may be revisited periodically, coordinating globally regulations to mitigate damaging 
“regulatory arbitrage” across borders.   To minimize the hazard of a “too big to fail” crises set by 
under-regulated financial institutions, this coordination applies also for the periodic adjustment of 
the minimum size of a financial institution under oversight, to ensure that a large enough share of 
each financial market is regulated. .     
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Global prudential regulations, SWFs, Hedge Funds, and other financial actors 
Private analysts put current sovereign wealth fund assets in the range of at $3 trillion or 
even higher, projected to grow to as much as $13 trillion in the next ten years.  This is an amount 
larger than the current global stock of foreign reserves of about $6 trillion.  While not a new 
phenomenon, the recent activities and projected growth of SWFs have stirred debate. Much of the 
discussion has been devoted to the call for individual SWFs to be more transparent about their 
investment approach.  This would require providing more information on the type and amounts of 
assets they hold, and about their governance structure, by clarifying how decisions are made and 
monitored.  SWFs asset holdings now amount to much less than the funds under management by 
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies: $20-30 trillion each. But they are more 
than the $1.9 trillion under management by hedge funds and almost $1 trillion by private equity 
groups [see Aizeman and Glick, FRBSF Economic Letter 2007-38].    
There are currently no rules concerning the investment practices of sovereign wealth funds, 
and both Western governments, and governments with sovereign wealth funds, remain suspicious 
of each other. These funds have also been instrumental in the subprime crisis – Citigroup, Merrill 
Lynch, and other major financial players in the US have all received capital infusions from 
investors in East Asia and the Middle East. As sovereign wealth funds purchase sizeable stakes in 
some of the most important financial institutions in the world, the lines between economic and 
foreign policy blur.  Apprehension about the size effect of these funds is not new, reflecting the 
possibility that a large fund may use its market power strategically, potentially leading to greater 
financial instability, and occasionally benefiting large players. An example of these concerns is the 
alleged role of large private hedge funds in coordinating speculative attacks on the British pound 
and other currencies participating in the European exchange rate mechanism in the early 1990s. 
The extra dimension added by SWFs is the possibility that sovereign investors may use their 
strategic leverage for narrow nationalistic objectives (Summers, Financial Times, 7-29-2007). 
These may include supporting domestic "national champion" firms, buying controlling positions in 
foreign firms with proprietary knowledge, or increasing control of financial and tangible 
infrastructure abroad (telecommunication, energy, ports, etc.). The adverse political reaction to 
efforts by China's state-owned oil enterprise to acquire the US oil firm Unocal in 2005, and by the 
United Arab Emirates' DP World to acquire several major US ports, are well known. The Abu   7
Dhabi Investment Authority's recent $7.5 billion investment in Citigroup prompted less concern, in 
part because of the Authority's assurances that it would not seek any control or active management.   
Imposing mandatory periodic reports of the balance sheet exposure of all significant 
financial institutions would go a long way towards alleviating most of these concerns.  In the 
absence of proper transparency, nationalistic objectives can be advanced indirectly by delegating 
them to more anonymous third parties, thereby bypassing SWFs.  In case of need, greater 
transparency may allow the regulator to apply a battery of anti-trust and other regulations to deal 
with what may be deemed improper play by large financial operators.  Yet, due to principal-agent 
problems, some SWFs may be reluctant to increase their transparency.  But by no means is 
resistance to greater transparency unique to SWFs. Hedge funds and private equity managers may 
share similar views about greater transparency.  This, however, is not a reason to prevent a 
country’s national regulators from using mandatory codes of transparency with strict enforcement 
of confidentiality, on all significant financial players investing in that country.  The required 
transparency may reflect the riskiness of the asset classes involved.  This approach provides a 
menu of choices to SWFs and hedge funds.  Some SWFs and other financial intermediaries may 
opt for passive holdings of well-diversified indexes, with a minimal transparency load.  The 
Norwegian SWF provides a good example of a large fund following what is practically state of the 
art management practice.  The Fund’s investment strategy is to maximize financial return with 
moderate risk, and a high degree of transparency. The long-term strategic allocation, as of June 
2008, consisted of equities and fixed income instruments, where equities account for 60 per cent of 
the Fund's strategic benchmark portfolio. The size of the Fund implies that it owns about 1 per cent 
of listed European equities and ½ per cent of listed equities on a global basis. Such a strategy, as 
long as it follows a passive investment mode with low frequency adjustments, provides ample 
opportunities for diversification gains, minimizing the local taxpayer exposure and not exposing 
the financial system to zero (or negative) sum games.  Other players may opt for more narrowly 
targeted investment strategy, potentially associated with derivatives and leverage.  These are 
precisely the activities that would be regulated.  Chances are that improved global prudential 
regulation will also reduce the use of exotic instruments, but this is what a financial doctor may 
call for: under-regulated financial players tend to use and abuse these derivatives.   
The recent collapse of Iceland, operating in ways akin to a “national hedge fund” illustrate 
the risk that under-regulated investment, fuelled by excessive leverage, leads down the road to   8
political tensions among nations.  The recent downfall of Icelandic banks operating in the UK 
resulted in the application of UK’s Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act to freeze the British 
assets of Iceland’s Landsbanki bank, triggering political tensions between the UK and Iceland. It 
will be a global political calamity if a collapse driven by under-regulated SWFs, foreign hedge 
funds, or other foreign players leads to similar political tensions between larger countries.  Yet, 
under-regulated domestic hedge funds can deliver equal or greater damage, as was vividly 
illustrated by the collapse of LTCM in the late 1990s, and Lehman Brothers recently.  Indeed, 
when Warren Buffett referred to derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction,” he had the 
good sense of focusing on the weapon, and not the nationality of the user.  With proper global 
regulatory design, there would be fewer reasons to discriminate between foreign versus domestic 
funds.  Applying uniform standards of discourse, leverage and capital ratio regulations would level 
the financial field.  While the actual regulation in each country may be the domain of domestic 
regulators [Treasury, Central Bank, and others like them], the delicate task of coordinating a 
minimum uniform global standard may be the domain of organizations like the Bank for 
International Settlements [BIS], the International Monetary Fund [IMF], and similar agencies.  
Doing it properly may require an overhaul of these organizations, upgrading the share of qualified 
practitioners and financial economists versed with recent financial innovations, and equipping 
them with enough resources and talent to track, investigate and regulate the evolving financial 
innovations as well as the financial mischief that would certainly continue to emerge.  Following 
these steps would reduce “regulatory arbitrage,” and the political concerns that views SWFs and 
foreign capital as the seeds of domestic problems.  Refraining from differential nationalist 
treatment may also facilitate deeper global diversification, while minimizing the downside risk of 
instability brought about due to excessive leverage.  
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 II.  Hoarding and using international reserves – a reassessment 
 
“The shortest period of time lies between the minute you put some money away for a rainy 
day and the unexpected arrival of rain”  
                                                                                          Jane Bryant Quinn 
 
While the United States has been epicentre and origin of the current crisis, the high degree of 
financial and economic integration has shown the argument that developing countries have 
“decoupled” from the deterioration of the American economy to be wishful thinking. Developing 
countries that have, on average, benefited from their integration into the global economy are now 
facing the darker side of globalisation. The rapid decline in trade, coupled with a flight to quality 
and the deleveraging of financial flows to developing countries, is putting the adjustment 
capacities of developing countries to the test. While there is no way to avoid the “stabilisation 
blues”, the hope is that the stronger initial position of developing countries will allow them a softer 
landing than in previous crises.   
 
Staggering accumulation 
A key development of the last two decades is the proliferation of hybrid exchange-rate regimes in 
developing countries, where a growing number of countries have adopted managed exchange-rate 
flexibility, buffered by the accumulation of sizeable foreign reserves. Reserves-to-GDP ratios have 
increased dramatically, especially in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, most significantly 
amongst emerging markets. This accumulation was initially led by countries in East Asia, with 
Latin American and oil-exporting countries joining this trend during the dramatic rise in 
commodity prices in the early 2000s. The magnitude of accumulation in recent years is simply 
staggering: reserves increased from about $1 trillion in 1990 to an estimated $7 trillion by June 
2008, according to data compiled by the International Monetary Fund. As has been well 
documented, the accumulation of vast pools of assets in relatively safe, but low-yielding, 
international bonds has led a number of countries to channel part of their reserves into sovereign 
wealth funds as they seek higher return on a portion of these reserves. 
These developments have triggered intense debate, with many observers calling into question the 
rationale for the hoarding of large liquidity by relatively poor countries. This article revisits this   10
debate in light of the present crisis and the use of reserves during episodes of intense market 
turmoil.   
 
 
Theories of reserve accumulation 
 
It merits taking stock of the theoretical work on reserve holdings and accumulation. Initially, the 
literature focused on the use of reserves as a buffer stock against external shocks. Accordingly, the 
optimal level of reserves balanced the macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in the absence of 
reserves with the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Although useful, this “buffer stock” model 
failed to fully account for the hoarding of reserves, especially in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis. First, under this model, one would expect the greater flexibility of the exchange 
rates since the early 1990s to reduce reserve accumulation. Second, observers have noted that 
developing countries frequently borrow at much higher interest rates than what they earn on 




That is not to say that the buffer stock model is irrelevant – indeed it has been highly applicable in 
the context of financial integration, which has increased emerging markets’ exposure to volatile, 
short-term inflows of capital, subject to frequent sudden stops and reversals. Sudden stops have led 
to sharp reductions in economic growth, costly banking crises and even social instability. In these 
circumstances, reserve accumulation is a precautionary measure, providing the domestic 
authorities with access to hard currency to cover essential expenses and mitigate the adverse 
consequences of capital flight in times when the country is unable to borrow internationally and 
the domestic tax capacity is shrinking rapidly. This dynamic has been particularly useful in 
explaining the accumulation of reserve in the countries affected by the Asian crisis.  
 
The more recent literature has, however, emphasised a number of additional motives to the self-
insurance argument. According to “mercantilist” interpretation, reserves accumulation is a by-
product of promoting exports through exchange-rate intervention, which is needed to create better 
jobs, thereby absorbing abundant labour in traditional sectors. These perspectives suggest that the 
                                                 
1 The recent literature provided several interpretations for these puzzles. For an overview, see Aizenman, J. (2007).   11
massive hoarding of reserves by China in recent years is driven by some combination of 
mercantilist and self-insurance motives. In addition to this, it is likely that “mercantilist hoarding” 
by one country will induce “competitive hoarding” by other countries in order to prevent any 
competitive advantage gained by the first country.  
 
The varying responses to the crisis  
 
The unfolding crisis illustrated the large exposure of emerging markets to the whims of turbulent 
markets. On impact, the crisis affected diverse countries like Brazil, Chile and South Korea in 
remarkably similar ways, most notably through a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate. Consider 
the fact that Chile has a commodity-based currency, Korea is a prime example of a diversified 
manufacturing country, while Brazil’s level of industrialisation is somewhere in-between that of 
Chile and Korea. Yet, the common denominator of between how these countries have been 
affected during the crisis is that, by virtue of their financial integration, the flight to quality and 
deleveraging by investors around the world resulted in capital flight from these economies, as 
foreign investors opted to reduce their exposure to emerging markets indiscriminately.  
Contrasting approaches 
Brazil and Chile have, so far, made very limited active use of their reserves to cushion the 
inevitable adjustment. Chile’s reserves are well above their level of half a year ago, while Brazil’s 
are about the same as a year ago. In contrast, Korea’s reserves have dropped by roughly $60 billion 
in half a year, a decline of about 25%. Indeed, Korea reserves were key to the bailout package it 
unveiled in the second half of 2008. The centre-piece of the package was a $100 billion, three-year 
government guarantee for banks’ debt raised abroad before July 2009. This sum is more than 
sufficient to cover Korean banks’ foreign debt maturing by June 2009, estimated by the Korean 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance to be about $80 billion. Needless to say, the credibility of 
Korea’s bailout package was reinforced by its massive stock of reserves. A similar bailout package 
was instrumented by the Bank of Russia, though this was done in the context of intensified 
involvement of the Russian state in managing its vast natural resources, including a willingness to 
impose what amounted to de facto capital controls. Russia’s large stock of reserves before the 
crisis (exceeding $600 billion) has so far allowed it to prevent a complete collapse of its banking 
system, by resisting larger exchange-rate depreciation through limited capital controls.  
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Yet, while Korea and Russia large reserve holdings have undoubtedly been a stabilising force 
during the current crisis, it is important to caution that these benefits must be weighed against the 
likely negative incentive effects they create for the long run. The hoarding of reserves may indeed 
increase the danger of moral hazard associated with the private banking system over-borrowing in 
foreign currency when actors anticipate such a bailout and imbed it into their borrowing and 
lending decisions.  
 
Decisions on whether to deploy reserves also depend on the nature of a country’s vulnerabilities. 
Korea’s large depreciation, for example, reflects its heavy exposure to deleveraging, given that 
about half of its stocks foreign-owned at the onset of the crisis, at a time when domestic banks 
borrowed in hard currencies. While Brazil and Chile were less exposed to deleveraging (owing to 
lower foreign ownership of their equities), they are highly exposed to deteriorations in the terms of 
trade for their commodities – Chile due to its reliance on exports of copper, Brazil due to its 
reliance on exports of agriculture products. 
 
Getting the timing right 
One may ask whether Brazil and Chile have reacted too timidly in refraining from using their 
reserves more aggressively to cushion the adjustment process. There are several conflicting 
interpretations of this timidity. As the depth and the duration of the global liquidity crisis and 
recession is unknown, commodity-exporting countries with relatively low savings rates and little 
room for fiscal expansion – typical features economies of India and those of Latin America – may 
be reluctant to draw down their reserves. Policymakers may also prefer that the bulk of the 
required adjustment take place through a depreciation of the exchange rate, enabling them to save 
their reserves for even leaner years, if a prolonged period of weakness in their terms of trade occur. 
Indeed, such adjustment may be a more prudent path than Russia’s willingness to spend more than 
quarter of its reserves to mitigate exchange-rate depreciation at a relatively early stage of the crisis. 
 
Another reason for the limited use of reserves is that the most important intervention and signalling 
effects may have occurred through the swap lines extended by the Federal Reserve in October 
2008 to the central banks of Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Singapore. Finally, central banks 
may have been reluctant to draw down their reserves, fearing that it would engender or contribute   13
to expectations of further depreciation. This concern applies especially to Latin American 
countries with limited room for fiscal adjustment. 
 
Swap lines 
Finally, it is important to consider the decision to use reserves against alternatives sources of 
funding during the current crisis. Indeed, the unprecedented provision of $120 billion in swap lines 
to emerging markets by the Federal Reserve provided welcome relief and an important signal of 
the willingness of the American authorities to limit the contagion. It would, however, be premature 
to conclude that the selective credit lines provided by the Fed and the international financial 
institutions negate the benefits of the earlier hoarding of reserves. In long run, the highly 
exceptional circumstances leading to the formation of these swap lines in the current crisis are 
unlikely to apply in the context of more localised sudden stops. Moreover, the uncertainty 
regarding the coverage and duration of these swap arrangements and delays due to bureaucratic 
and political costs, suggests that these ad hoc facilities would not suffice in protecting exposed 
countries from a crisis similar to the Asian financial crisis in the absence of self insurance. They 
may well have acted as a brake on the sales of US Treasuries, through central banks liquefying 
their assets, a possibility that may have concerned US authorities. 
 
 
Placing reserves in a wider context 
 
An excessive and myopic focus on the question of whether reserves were actively deployed during 
the crisis or not, miss a key point: countries adjust their policy frameworks and macroeconomic 
strategies dynamically to best fit the challenges of the day. Here it is useful to think in terms of 
policymakers’ preferred configurations within the Mundell-Fleming “policy trilemma.” A 
fundamental insight of the Mundell-Fleming model is that countries face a policy trilemma, where 
they may choose any two – but not all three – of the following goals: monetary independence, 
exchange-rate stability and financial integration.  
 
Middle ground 
Over the last two decades, most developing countries have opted for increasing financial 
integration, implying that they must either forego exchange-rate stability (if they wish to preserve a 
degree of monetary independence) or forego monetary independence (if they wish to preserve   14
exchange rate stability).
2 More specifically, a recent paper finds that developing countries have 
moved towards greater exchange-rate flexibility and deeper financial integration.
3 Both trends are 
more pronounced for the emerging markets than for the non-emerging developing countries. 
Indeed, since the turn of the century, developing countries have converged towards managed 
exchange-rate flexibility, buffered by sizable reserve holdings. This has enabled them to retain a 
fair degree of monetary autonomy, even as financial integration continued – a sort of “middle-
ground configuration” within the trilemma. 
 
One may view the response of many developing countries to the current crisis in the context of this 
new trend – allowing the real exchange rate and monetary policy to take the first brunt of the 
adjustment. Considering the severity of the crisis in the industrialised economies, the absence of 
deeper adjustment in emerging markets (so far) is a testament to the degree to which this new 
middle ground in the trilemma, with proper governance and management, allows for a softer 
landing in the aftermath of major external events. 
 
A word of caution 
Yet, despite the apparent relative success of this strategy in the initial stages of the crisis, the brunt 
of the adjustment may yet await us. While exchange-rate and interest-rate adjustments can cushion 
the landing, a deep crisis frequently ends by testing the fiscal and institutional capacity of 
countries. The hoarding of reserves may be viewed as being part of a broader buffer policy, which 
is ultimately impacted by both the fiscal and monetary-policy response. 
 
This point about the interaction between the reserve and the monetary and fiscal policies is vividly 
illustrated by the proliferation of sovereign wealth funds, mostly by commodity-exporting 
countries.
4 Essentially, these funds channel part of the export revenues into accumulating a wider 
spectrum of foreign assets. A prime example of the fiscal linkages is found in Chile, where by 
saving the copper dollars in the country’s sovereign wealth funds to meet future liabilities rather 
                                                 
2 See Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. and Taylor, A. (2008). “Financial Stability, the Trilemma, and International 
Reserves”, NBER Working Paper No.14217. 
 
3 See Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. and Ito, H. (2008). “Assessing the Emerging Global Financial Architecture: Measuring 
the Trilemma's Configurations over Time”, NBER Working Paper No. 14533 
4 See Aizenman and Glick (2008).    15
than exchanging them for pesos, the government has eased pressure on the peso. Andrés Velasco, 
the Chilean finance minister, views the Chilean sovereign wealth funds as part of the same 
counter-cyclical approach that has been successfully conducted in the country since the 1990s. As 
of early 2009, the Chilean sovereign wealth funds have accumulated more than $20 billion, 
providing significant scope for fiscal accommodation and softening the deepening recessionary 
impact of the liquidity and deleveraging crisis.   
 
The choice of the speed of drawing on accumulated resources, both in the form of reserves and as 
sovereign wealth, is a delicate one. It hinges, amongst other things, on the anticipated future course 
of the global economy, the domestic adjustment capacity and the degree of financial integration of 
the country in question. The trade-offs for a country like India differ from those of Chile, as India 
is less integrated to the global financial system and its government has less room for fiscal 
adjustment due to its significant and growing fiscal deficits.   
 
As suggested by the Mundell-Fleming framework, countries that are only partially integrated with 
the global financial system may opt for a different adjustment, as they tend to be less exposed to 
capital flight and deleveraging. In China, for example, the available information suggests that the 
crisis has had little discernable impact on reserves (so far). This is in sharp contrast to India, which 
has accommodated the crisis with sizable downward adjustment in reserves and a significant 
depreciation of the rupee, both by about 20% as of December 2008 from their respective peaks 
earlier in the year. 
 
The renminbi question 
The path of adjustment in China has led to a growing concern among policymakers in the 
industrialised countries that the crisis may reverse the trend towards the appreciation of the 
renminbi and lead to the continuation of reserve hoarding by China. If this is the course chosen by 
China, it would be viewed by the United States and Europe as a reaffirmation of its mercantilist 
drive. And indeed, there would be considerable risks to China in pursuing this course: the sheer 
size its exports imply that the scope for China to “export its way out of the crisis” and avoid the 
domestic adjustment is very limited. The downside risk of mercantilist adjustment by China (or 
even the perception thereof) is that, if overdone, it would result in competitive depreciations and   16
“beggar-thy-neighbour” type trade policies. As the painful experience of the Great Depression 
showed, such policies further destabilise the global economy. Indeed, prudent adjustment calls for 
coordinated fiscal expansion. 
 
The future role of reserves 
 
The present crisis suggests that countries that hoarded reserves have been reaping the benefits. For 
most developing countries, earlier concerns about excessive hoarding have proved overblown. The 
crisis illustrates the importance of the self insurance provided by reserves, as well as the usefulness 
of policies that channel a share of the windfall gains associated with improvements in the terms-of-
trade to reserves and sovereign wealth funds. While the recent drop in global commodity prices 
and equity returns may have reduced the relative appeal of sovereign wealth funds, a resumption of 
global growth will restore their attractiveness. However, if the “great moderation” is indeed over 
and volatility in the financial markets remains high, monetary authorities may place greater weight 
on holding highly liquid reserves as a means of minimising the expected costs of sudden stop, 
rather than embracing the sovereign wealth approach. 
 
Most emerging markets have been relying mostly on exchange-rate and interest-rate adjustment to 
accommodate the shocks unleashed by the crisis, making only limited use of reserves to cushion 
sharp adjustment in their real exchange rate and to signal their credit worthiness in turbulent times. 
While not a panacea, substantial reserves holdings may be the difference between a soft or hard 
landing. The willingness to draw down on reserves and the speed at which this is done, reflect a 
complex interaction between structural and political economy factors.  
 
New fear? 
More generally, the reluctance of many countries to draw down on their reserve holdings raises the 
possibility that they may now suffer less from the well-known “fear of floating” than from a “fear 
of losing international reserves”, which may signal a deterioration in the credit worthiness of a 
country. Mitigating this concern may be the prime responsibility of the international financial 
institutions. Finally, while the mercantilist concerns about China have not been alleviated by the 
crisis, the magnitude of the global slowdown is likely to be too large for China to attempt 
exporting its way out of the crisis and completely avoid the domestic adjustment. With proper   17
coordination and luck, competitive depreciations and competitive hoardings can be minimised, 





Aizenman, J. (2007). “Large Hoarding of International Reserves and the Emerging Global 
Economic Architecture”, NBER Working Paper No. 13277.  Keynote address, The 
Manchester School, Vol. 76, September, 487-503. 
Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. and Ito, H. (2008). “Assessing the Emerging Global Financial 
Architecture: Measuring the Trilemma's Configurations over Time”, NBER Working Paper 
No. 14533. 
 
Aizenman, J., and Glick, R. (2008). “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stylized Facts about their 
Determinants and Governance”, NBER Working Paper No. 14562. 
 
Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. and Taylor, A. (2008). “Financial Stability, the Trilemma, and 
International Reserves”, NBER Working Paper No. 14217. 